diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/sandbox-dev')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/ChangeLog | 91 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/Makefile | 62 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/canonicalize.c | 194 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | src/sandbox-dev/create-localdecls | 95 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/libctest.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/libsandbox.c | 1214 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.bashrc | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.c | 816 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.h | 69 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sandbox-dev/sandbox_futils.c | 352 |
10 files changed, 2907 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/ChangeLog b/src/sandbox-dev/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3a052a128 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +# ChangeLog for Path Sandbox +# Copyright 1999-2004 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2 +# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/ChangeLog,v 1.9 2004/10/04 14:08:46 vapier Exp $ + + 16 Dec 2002; J Robert Ray <jrray@gentoo.org> Makefile libsandbox.c : + + Instead of parsing the SANDBOX_* env variables on each syscall, save the + result in a global sbcontext pointer and cache the value of the env vars + to detect later on if they have changed and need to be re-parsed. Works + around bug 233. + + 16 Dec 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> create-localdecls : + + Fix memory leak for mips, bug #12236. Thanks to Torgeir Hansen <torgeir@trenger.ro> + for this fix. + + 4 Dec 2002; J Robert Ray <jrray@gentoo.org> sandbox.h sandbox_futils.c : + + sandbox_futils defined a dirname() function that was masking the same + function in glibc and was broken (e.g.: SANDBOX_DIR was being set to + '/usr/lib/portage/bi/'). Fixed function to return expected results and + renamed it to sb_dirname() to no longer mask the glibc function. Closes bug + 11231. + + 4 Dec 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Fix a segfault in libsandbox.c if canonicalize() was called with + first parameter = NULL. + + 1 Sep 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Fix my braindead 'return 1;' in a void function. Updated sandbox.c, + cleanup() for this. + + Change cleanup() in sandbox.c not to exit with fail status if + the pidsfile is missing. We really should still display sandbox + violations if they occured. + + 31 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Update cleanup() in sandbox.c to remove the PIDSFILE if this is + the last sandbox running. + + 25 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Major cleanups to mainly libsandbox.c again. + + 22 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Add copyrights to sandbox.h and sandbox_futils.h. If wrong, the + parties involved should please contact me so that we can fix it. + + Add opendir wrapper to libsandbox.c. + + 21 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Do some more cleanups to ecanonicalize(), as it dropped filenames in + rare cases (after my symlink cleanups), and caused glibc to bork. + These fixes went into canonicalize.c. + + 20 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Fix spawn_shell() and main() in sandbox.c to properly return fail + status. + + 19 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + The new canonicalize() function in libsandbox.c also resolved symlinks, + which caused on cleaning sandbox errors if the symlink pointed to a + file in the live root. Ripped out canonicalize() and realpath() from + glibc; removed the symlink stuff, and changed them to ecanonicalize() + and erealpath(). + + 18 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> : + + Ripped out all the wrappers, and implemented those of InstallWatch. + Losts of cleanups and bugfixes. Implement a execve that forces + $LIBSANDBOX in $LD_PRELOAD. We can now thus do away with the feared + /etc/ld.so.preload (*g*) ... Made the needed changes to sandbox.c, + sandbox.h and sandbox_futils.c. Rewrote the Makefile for most + parts; it now have an install target. + + Reformat the whole thing to look somewhat like the reworked sandbox.c + and new sandbox.h and sandbox_futils.c from: + + Brad House <brad@mainstreetsoftworks.com>. + + Additional Copyrights now due to the InstallWatch code: + + Copyright (C) 1998-9 Pancrazio `Ezio' de Mauro <p@demauro.net> + diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/Makefile b/src/sandbox-dev/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..83b00e302 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# Copyright (C) 2001 Geert Bevin, Uwyn, http://www.uwyn.com +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, v2 or later +# Author : Geert Bevin <gbevin@uwyn.com> +# +# Modified 15 Apr 2002 Jon Nelson <jnelson@gentoo.org> +# Clean up Makefile somewhat, and use make's implicit rules +# +# Modified 19 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> +# Major rewrite to support new stuff +# +# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/Makefile,v 1.3 2002/12/16 22:28:05 jrray Exp $ + +CC = gcc +LD = ld +CFLAGS = +OBJ_DEFINES = -D_GNU_SOURCE -DPIC -fPIC -D_REENTRANT +LIBS = +LDFLAGS = +DESTDIR = + +TARGETS = libsandbox.so sandbox + +all: $(TARGETS) + +sandbox: sandbox.o sandbox_futils.o + $(CC) $^ -ldl -lc -o $@ + +sandbox.o: sandbox.c sandbox.h + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -Wall -c sandbox.c + +sandbox_futils.o: sandbox_futils.c sandbox.h + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -Wall -c $(OBJ_DEFINES) sandbox_futils.c + +libsandbox.so: libsandbox.o sandbox_futils.o canonicalize.o + $(LD) $^ -shared -fPIC -ldl -lc -lpthread -o $@ + +libsandbox.o: libsandbox.c localdecls.h + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -Wall -c $(OBJ_DEFINES) libsandbox.c + +canonicalize.o: canonicalize.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -Wall -c $(OBJ_DEFINES) canonicalize.c + +localdecls.h: create-localdecls libctest.c + ./create-localdecls + + +install: all + install -d -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)/lib + install -d -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/portage/bin + install -d -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/portage/lib + install -m 0755 libsandbox.so $(DESTDIR)/lib + install -m 0755 sandbox $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/portage/bin + install -m 0644 sandbox.bashrc $(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/portage/lib + + +clean: + rm -f $(TARGETS) + rm -f *.o *~ core + rm -f localdecls.h + + +# vim:expandtab noai:cindent ai diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/canonicalize.c b/src/sandbox-dev/canonicalize.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7ecd57ec6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/canonicalize.c @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +/* Return the canonical absolute name of a given file. + Copyright (C) 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + This file is part of the GNU C Library. + + The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + + The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + License along with the GNU C Library; if not, write to the Free + Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA + 02111-1307 USA. */ + +/* + * $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/canonicalize.c,v 1.2 2002/08/26 03:28:30 azarah Exp $ + */ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stddef.h> + +#ifndef __set_errno +# define __set_errno(val) errno = (val) +#endif + +/* Return the canonical absolute name of file NAME. A canonical name + does not contain any `.', `..' components nor any repeated path + separators ('/') or symlinks. All path components must exist. If + RESOLVED is null, the result is malloc'd; otherwise, if the + canonical name is PATH_MAX chars or more, returns null with `errno' + set to ENAMETOOLONG; if the name fits in fewer than PATH_MAX chars, + returns the name in RESOLVED. If the name cannot be resolved and + RESOLVED is non-NULL, it contains the path of the first component + that cannot be resolved. If the path can be resolved, RESOLVED + holds the same value as the value returned. */ + +/* Modified: 19 Aug 2002; Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> + * + * Cleaned up unneeded stuff, and change so that it will not + * resolve symlinks. Also prepended a 'e' to functions that + * I did not rip out. + * + */ + +static char * +ecanonicalize (const char *name, char *resolved) +{ + char *rpath, *dest; + const char *start, *end, *rpath_limit; + long int path_max; + + if (name == NULL) + { + /* As per Single Unix Specification V2 we must return an error if + either parameter is a null pointer. We extend this to allow + the RESOLVED parameter to be NULL in case the we are expected to + allocate the room for the return value. */ + __set_errno (EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + if (name[0] == '\0') + { + /* As per Single Unix Specification V2 we must return an error if + the name argument points to an empty string. */ + __set_errno (ENOENT); + return NULL; + } + +#ifdef PATH_MAX + path_max = PATH_MAX; +#else + path_max = pathconf (name, _PC_PATH_MAX); + if (path_max <= 0) + path_max = 1024; +#endif + + rpath = resolved ? alloca (path_max) : malloc (path_max); + rpath_limit = rpath + path_max; + + if (name[0] != '/') + { + if (!getcwd (rpath, path_max)) + { + rpath[0] = '\0'; + goto error; + } + dest = strchr (rpath, '\0'); + } + else + { + rpath[0] = '/'; + dest = rpath + 1; + } + + for (start = end = name; *start; start = end) + { + /* Skip sequence of multiple path-separators. */ + while (*start == '/') + ++start; + + /* Find end of path component. */ + for (end = start; *end && *end != '/'; ++end) + /* Nothing. */; + + if (end - start == 0) + break; + else if (end - start == 1 && start[0] == '.') + /* nothing */; + else if (end - start == 2 && start[0] == '.' && start[1] == '.') + { + /* Back up to previous component, ignore if at root already. */ + if (dest > rpath + 1) + while ((--dest)[-1] != '/'); + } + else + { + size_t new_size; + + if (dest[-1] != '/') + *dest++ = '/'; + + if (dest + (end - start) >= rpath_limit) + { + ptrdiff_t dest_offset = dest - rpath; + + if (resolved) + { + __set_errno (ENAMETOOLONG); + if (dest > rpath + 1) + dest--; + *dest = '\0'; + goto error; + } + new_size = rpath_limit - rpath; + if (end - start + 1 > path_max) + new_size += end - start + 1; + else + new_size += path_max; + rpath = realloc (rpath, new_size); + rpath_limit = rpath + new_size; + if (rpath == NULL) + return NULL; + + dest = rpath + dest_offset; + } + + dest = __mempcpy (dest, start, end - start); + *dest = '\0'; + + } + } +#if 0 + if (dest > rpath + 1 && dest[-1] == '/') + --dest; +#endif + *dest = '\0'; + + return resolved ? memcpy (resolved, rpath, dest - rpath + 1) : rpath; + +error: + if (resolved) + strcpy (resolved, rpath); + else + free (rpath); + return NULL; +} + + +char * +erealpath (const char *name, char *resolved) +{ + if (resolved == NULL) + { + __set_errno (EINVAL); + return NULL; + } + + return ecanonicalize (name, resolved); +} + + +// vim:expandtab noai:cindent ai diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/create-localdecls b/src/sandbox-dev/create-localdecls new file mode 100755 index 000000000..5cb1a4d0c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/create-localdecls @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# This is a quick'n'dirty hack to make the program behave correctly +# under different systems. +# Example: +# when using libc5, (f)trucate's offset argument type is size_t with +# libc5, but it's off_t with libc6 (glibc2). +# +# Uhm... time to learn GNU autoconf :-) +# +# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/create-localdecls,v 1.2 2002/12/16 19:19:27 azarah Exp $ + +OUTFILE='localdecls.h' + +# if your arch needs to dlopen() glibc, add it here separated by space :] +BROKEN_RTLD_ARCHLIST="mips" + +echo '/* This file is automatically generated *' > $OUTFILE +echo ' * Modify create-localdecls instead of this */' >> $OUTFILE +echo >> $OUTFILE +echo '#ifndef __LOCALDECLS_H_' >> $OUTFILE +echo '#define __LOCALDECLS_H_' >> $OUTFILE +echo >> $OUTFILE + +### +### +### + +echo -n 'Checking truncate argument type... ' +if grep -q 'truncate.*size_t' /usr/include/unistd.h ; then + echo 'size_t' + echo '#define TRUNCATE_T size_t' >> $OUTFILE +else + echo 'off_t' # At least, I HOPE it's off_t :-) + echo '#define TRUNCATE_T off_t' >> $OUTFILE +fi + +### +### +### + +echo -n 'Checking libc version... ' +gcc -Wall -o libctest libctest.c +VERSION=`ldd libctest | grep libc\\.so | awk '{print $1}'` +rm libctest +echo $VERSION +echo "#define LIBC_VERSION \"$VERSION\"" >> $OUTFILE +if test "$VERSION" = 'libc.so.5' ; then + echo '#define BROKEN_RTLD_NEXT' >> $OUTFILE + echo '#define LIBC 5' >> $OUTFILE +else + # for the arch's that need to dlopen() libc to fetch real funcs! + # 16.12.02 -Torgeir Hansen <torgeir@trenger.ro> + MYARCH=`/bin/uname -m` + for x in $BROKEN_RTLD_ARCHLIST; do + if [ $x = $MYARCH ]; then + echo '#define BROKEN_RTLD_NEXT' >> $OUTFILE + fi + done + +fi + +if test "$VERSION" = 'libc.so.6' ; then + echo -n 'Checking glibc subversion... ' + tmp="`ldd /bin/sh | grep libc.so 2> /dev/null`" + LibcPath=`expr "$tmp" : '[^/]*\(/[^ ]*\)'` + tmp="`strings $LibcPath | grep -i 'c library'`" + OsLibcMajor=`expr "$tmp" : '.* \([0-9][0-9]*\)'` + OsLibcMinor=`expr "$tmp" : '.* [0-9][0-9]*\.\([0-9][0-9]*\)'` + case "$OsLibcMajor" in + 2) + # 2 is the glibc version + case "$OsLibcMinor" in + 0) + echo '#define GLIBC_MINOR 0' >> $OUTFILE + SUBVERSION='glibc-2.0' ;; + 1) + echo '#define GLIBC_MINOR 1' >> $OUTFILE + SUBVERSION='glibc-2.1' ;; + 2) + echo '#define GLIBC_MINOR 2' >> $OUTFILE + SUBVERSION='glibc-2.2' ;; + *) + echo 'Treated as glibc >= 2.1 (finger crossed)' + echo '#define GLIBC_MINOR 1' >> $OUTFILE + SUBVERSION='glibc-2.1' ;; + esac + ;; + esac +fi + +echo >> $OUTFILE +echo '#endif' >> $OUTFILE +echo + diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/libctest.c b/src/sandbox-dev/libctest.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5fc92b508 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/libctest.c @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +/* Dummy program to check your libc version */ + +int main(void) { + return 0; +} + diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/libsandbox.c b/src/sandbox-dev/libsandbox.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ffb503592 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/libsandbox.c @@ -0,0 +1,1214 @@ +/* + * Path sandbox for the gentoo linux portage package system, initially + * based on the ROCK Linux Wrapper for getting a list of created files + * + * to integrate with bash, bash should have been built like this + * + * ./configure --prefix=<prefix> --host=<host> --without-gnu-malloc + * + * it's very important that the --enable-static-link option is NOT specified + * + * Copyright (C) 2001 Geert Bevin, Uwyn, http://www.uwyn.com + * Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, v2 or later + * Author : Geert Bevin <gbevin@uwyn.com> + * + * Post Bevin leaving Gentoo ranks: + * -------------------------------- + * Ripped out all the wrappers, and implemented those of InstallWatch. + * Losts of cleanups and bugfixes. Implement a execve that forces $LIBSANDBOX + * in $LD_PRELOAD. Reformat the whole thing to look somewhat like the reworked + * sandbox.c from Brad House <brad@mainstreetsoftworks.com>. + * + * Martin Schlemmer <azarah@gentoo.org> (18 Aug 2002) + * + * Partly Copyright (C) 1998-9 Pancrazio `Ezio' de Mauro <p@demauro.net>, + * as some of the InstallWatch code was used. + * + * + * $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/libsandbox.c,v 1.4 2002/12/16 22:28:05 jrray Exp $ + * + */ + +/* Uncomment below to enable wrapping of mknod(). + * This is broken currently. */ +/* #define WRAP_MKNOD */ + + +#define open xxx_open +#define open64 xxx_open64 + +/* Wrapping mknod, do not have any effect, and + * wrapping __xmknod causes calls to it to segfault + */ +#ifdef WRAP_MKNOD +# define __xmknod xxx___xmknod +#endif + +#include <dirent.h> +#include <dlfcn.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <utime.h> +#include <semaphore.h> + +#ifdef WRAP_MKNOD +# undef __xmknod +#endif + +#undef open +#undef open64 + +#include "localdecls.h" +#include "sandbox.h" + +#define PIDS_FILE "/tmp/sandboxpids.tmp" + +#define FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE(func, path) \ + ((0 == is_sandbox_on()) || (1 == before_syscall(func, path))) + +#define FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE_INT(func, path, flags) \ + ((0 == is_sandbox_on()) || (1 == before_syscall_open_int(func, path, flags))) + +#define FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE_CHAR(func, path, mode) \ + ((0 == is_sandbox_on()) || (1 == before_syscall_open_char(func, path, mode))) + + +/* Macro to check if a wrapper is defined, if not + * then try to resolve it again. */ +#define check_dlsym(name) \ +{ \ + int old_errno=errno; \ + if (!true_ ## name) true_ ## name=get_dlsym(#name); \ + errno=old_errno; \ +} + +static char sandbox_lib[255]; + +typedef struct { + char *last_env; + int count; + char **strs; +} sbprefix_t; + +typedef struct { + int show_access_violation; + sbprefix_t deny; + sbprefix_t read; + sbprefix_t write; + sbprefix_t predict; +} sbcontext_t; + +/* glibc modified realpath() functions */ +char *erealpath (const char *name, char *resolved); + +static void init_wrappers(void); +static void *get_dlsym(const char *); +static void canonicalize(const char *, char *); +static int check_access(sbcontext_t *, const char *, const char *); +static int check_syscall(sbcontext_t *, const char *, const char *); +static int before_syscall(const char *, const char *); +static int before_syscall_open_int(const char *, const char *, int); +static int before_syscall_open_char(const char *, const char *, const char *); +static void clean_env_entries(sbprefix_t *); +static void init_context(sbcontext_t *); +static void init_env_entries(sbprefix_t *, char *); +static char* filter_path(const char*); +static int is_sandbox_on(); +static int is_sandbox_pid(); + +/* Wrapped functions */ + +extern int chmod(const char *, mode_t); +static int(*true_chmod)(const char *, mode_t); +extern int chown(const char *, uid_t, gid_t); +static int(*true_chown)(const char *, uid_t, gid_t); +extern int creat(const char *, mode_t); +static int(*true_creat)(const char *, mode_t); +extern FILE *fopen(const char *,const char*); +static FILE *(*true_fopen)(const char *,const char*); +extern int lchown(const char *, uid_t, gid_t); +static int(*true_lchown)(const char *, uid_t, gid_t); +extern int link(const char *, const char *); +static int(*true_link)(const char *, const char *); +extern int mkdir(const char *, mode_t); +static int(*true_mkdir)(const char *, mode_t); +extern DIR *opendir(const char *); +static DIR *(*true_opendir)(const char *); +#ifdef WRAP_MKNOD +extern int __xmknod(const char *, mode_t, dev_t); +static int(*true___xmknod)(const char *, mode_t, dev_t); +#endif +extern int open(const char *, int, ...); +static int(*true_open)(const char *, int, ...); +extern int rename(const char *, const char *); +static int(*true_rename)(const char *, const char *); +extern int rmdir(const char *); +static int(*true_rmdir)(const char *); +extern int symlink(const char *, const char *); +static int(*true_symlink)(const char *, const char *); +extern int truncate(const char *, TRUNCATE_T); +static int(*true_truncate)(const char *, TRUNCATE_T); +extern int unlink(const char *); +static int(*true_unlink)(const char *); + +#if (GLIBC_MINOR >= 1) + +extern int creat64(const char *, __mode_t); +static int(*true_creat64)(const char *, __mode_t); +extern FILE *fopen64(const char *,const char *); +static FILE *(*true_fopen64)(const char *,const char *); +extern int open64(const char *, int, ...); +static int(*true_open64)(const char *, int, ...); +extern int truncate64(const char *, __off64_t); +static int(*true_truncate64)(const char *, __off64_t); + +#endif + +extern int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv [], char *const envp[]); +static int (*true_execve)(const char *, char *const [], char *const []); + +static sbcontext_t* sbcontext = NULL; +static sem_t ctxsem; + +/* + * Initialize the shabang + */ + +static void init_wrappers(void) +{ + void *libc_handle = NULL; + +#ifdef BROKEN_RTLD_NEXT +// printf ("RTLD_LAZY"); + libc_handle = dlopen(LIBC_VERSION, RTLD_LAZY); +#else +// printf ("RTLD_NEXT"); + libc_handle = RTLD_NEXT; +#endif + + true_chmod = dlsym(libc_handle, "chmod"); + true_chown = dlsym(libc_handle, "chown"); + true_creat = dlsym(libc_handle, "creat"); + true_fopen = dlsym(libc_handle, "fopen"); + true_lchown = dlsym(libc_handle, "lchown"); + true_link = dlsym(libc_handle, "link"); + true_mkdir = dlsym(libc_handle, "mkdir"); + true_opendir = dlsym(libc_handle, "opendir"); +#ifdef WRAP_MKNOD + true___xmknod = dlsym(libc_handle, "__xmknod"); +#endif + true_open = dlsym(libc_handle, "open"); + true_rename = dlsym(libc_handle, "rename"); + true_rmdir = dlsym(libc_handle, "rmdir"); + true_symlink = dlsym(libc_handle, "symlink"); + true_truncate = dlsym(libc_handle, "truncate"); + true_unlink = dlsym(libc_handle, "unlink"); + +#if (GLIBC_MINOR >= 1) + true_creat64 = dlsym(libc_handle, "creat64"); + true_fopen64 = dlsym(libc_handle, "fopen64"); + true_open64 = dlsym(libc_handle, "open64"); + true_truncate64 = dlsym(libc_handle, "truncate64"); +#endif + + true_execve = dlsym(libc_handle, "execve"); +} + +void _init(void) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + char *tmp_string = NULL; + + if (sem_init(&ctxsem, 0, 1)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create semaphore\n"); + abort(); + } + + init_wrappers(); + + /* Get the path and name to this library */ + tmp_string = get_sandbox_lib("/"); + strncpy(sandbox_lib, tmp_string, 254); + + if (tmp_string) free(tmp_string); + tmp_string = NULL; + + errno = old_errno; +} + +void _fini(void) +{ + if (sbcontext) { + clean_env_entries(&sbcontext->deny); + clean_env_entries(&sbcontext->read); + clean_env_entries(&sbcontext->write); + clean_env_entries(&sbcontext->predict); + free(sbcontext); + sbcontext = NULL; + } + + /* free the semaphore */ + sem_destroy(&ctxsem); +} + +static void canonicalize(const char *path, char *resolved_path) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + + /* If path == NULL, return or we get a segfault */ + if (NULL == path) return; + + if(!erealpath(path, resolved_path) && (path[0] != '/')) { + /* The path could not be canonicalized, append it + * to the current working directory if it was not + * an absolute path + */ + getcwd(resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN - 2); + strcat(resolved_path, "/"); + strncat(resolved_path, path, MAXPATHLEN - 1 - strlen(resolved_path)); + erealpath(resolved_path, resolved_path); + } + + errno = old_errno; +} + +static void *get_dlsym(const char *symname) +{ + void *libc_handle = NULL; + void *symaddr = NULL; + +#ifdef BROKEN_RTLD_NEXT + libc_handle = dlopen(LIBC_VERSION, RTLD_LAZY); + if (!libc_handle) { + printf("libsandbox.so: Can't dlopen libc: %s\n", dlerror()); + abort(); + } +#else + libc_handle = RTLD_NEXT; +#endif + + symaddr = dlsym(libc_handle, symname); + if (!symaddr) { + printf("libsandbox.so: Can't resolve %s: %s\n", symname, dlerror()); + abort(); + } + + return symaddr; +} + +/* + * Wrapper Functions + */ + +int chmod(const char *path, mode_t mode) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(path, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("chmod", canonic) { + check_dlsym(chmod); + result = true_chmod(path, mode); + } + + return result; +} + +int chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(path, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("chown", canonic) { + check_dlsym(chown); + result = true_chown(path, owner, group); + } + + return result; +} + +int creat(const char *pathname, mode_t mode) +{ +/* Is it a system call? */ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("creat", canonic) { + check_dlsym(open); + result = true_open(pathname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, mode); + } + + return result; +} + +FILE *fopen(const char *pathname, const char *mode) +{ + FILE *result = NULL; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE_CHAR("fopen", canonic, mode) { + check_dlsym(fopen); + result = true_fopen(pathname,mode); + } + + return result; +} + +int lchown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group) +{ +/* Linux specific? */ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(path, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("lchown", canonic) { + check_dlsym(chown); + result = true_chown(path, owner, group); + } + + return result; +} + +int link(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) +{ + int result = -1; + char old_canonic[MAXPATHLEN], new_canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(oldpath, old_canonic); + canonicalize(newpath, new_canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("link", new_canonic) { + check_dlsym(link); + result = true_link(oldpath, newpath); + } + + return result; +} + +int mkdir(const char *pathname, mode_t mode) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("mkdir", canonic) { + check_dlsym(mkdir); + result = true_mkdir(pathname, mode); + } + + return result; +} + +DIR *opendir(const char *name) +{ + DIR *result = NULL; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(name, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("opendir", canonic) { + check_dlsym(opendir); + result = true_opendir(name); + } + + return result; +} + +#ifdef WRAP_MKNOD + +int __xmknod(const char *pathname, mode_t mode, dev_t dev) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("__xmknod", canonic) { + check_dlsym(__xmknod); + result = true___xmknod(pathname, mode, dev); + } + + return result; +} + +#endif + +int open(const char *pathname, int flags, ...) +{ +/* Eventually, there is a third parameter: it's mode_t mode */ + va_list ap; + mode_t mode = 0; + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (flags & O_CREAT) { + va_start(ap, flags); + mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t); + va_end(ap); + } + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE_INT("open", canonic, flags) { + /* We need to resolve open() realtime in some cases, + * else we get a segfault when running /bin/ps, etc + * in a sandbox */ + check_dlsym(open); + result=true_open(pathname, flags, mode); + } + + return result; +} + +int rename(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) +{ + int result = -1; + char old_canonic[MAXPATHLEN], new_canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(oldpath, old_canonic); + canonicalize(newpath, new_canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("rename", new_canonic) { + check_dlsym(rename); + result = true_rename(oldpath, newpath); + } + + return result; +} + +int rmdir(const char *pathname) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("rmdir", canonic) { + check_dlsym(rmdir); + result = true_rmdir(pathname); + } + + return result; +} + +int symlink(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) +{ + int result = -1; + char old_canonic[MAXPATHLEN], new_canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(oldpath, old_canonic); + canonicalize(newpath, new_canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("symlink", new_canonic) { + check_dlsym(symlink); + result = true_symlink(oldpath, newpath); + } + + return result; +} + +int truncate(const char *path, TRUNCATE_T length) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(path, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("truncate", canonic) { + check_dlsym(truncate); + result = true_truncate(path, length); + } + + return result; +} + +int unlink(const char *pathname) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("unlink", canonic) { + check_dlsym(unlink); + result = true_unlink(pathname); + } + + return result; +} + +#if (GLIBC_MINOR >= 1) + +int creat64(const char *pathname, __mode_t mode) +{ +/* Is it a system call? */ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("creat64", canonic) { + check_dlsym(open64); + result = true_open64(pathname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, mode); + } + + return result; +} + +FILE *fopen64(const char *pathname, const char *mode) +{ + FILE *result = NULL; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE_CHAR("fopen64", canonic, mode) { + check_dlsym(fopen64); + result = true_fopen(pathname,mode); + } + + return result; +} + +int open64(const char *pathname, int flags, ...) +{ +/* Eventually, there is a third parameter: it's mode_t mode */ + va_list ap; + mode_t mode = 0; + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (flags & O_CREAT) { + va_start(ap, flags); + mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t); + va_end(ap); + } + + canonicalize(pathname, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE_INT("open64", canonic, flags) { + check_dlsym(open64); + result=true_open64(pathname, flags, mode); + } + + return result; +} + +int truncate64(const char *path, __off64_t length) +{ + int result = -1; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + + canonicalize(path, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("truncate64", canonic) { + check_dlsym(truncate64); + result = true_truncate64(path, length); + } + + return result; +} + +#endif /* GLIBC_MINOR >= 1 */ + +/* + * Exec Wrappers + */ + +int execve(const char *filename, char *const argv [], char *const envp[]) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + int result = -1; + int count = 0; + char canonic[MAXPATHLEN]; + char *old_envp = NULL; + char *new_envp = NULL; + + canonicalize(filename, canonic); + + if FUNCTION_SANDBOX_SAFE("execve", canonic) { + while (envp[count] != NULL) { + if (strstr(envp[count], "LD_PRELOAD=") == envp[count]) { + if (NULL != strstr(envp[count], sandbox_lib)) { + break; + } else { + const int max_envp_len = strlen(envp[count]) + strlen(sandbox_lib) + 1; + + /* Backup envp[count], and set it to our own one which + * contains sandbox_lib */ + old_envp = envp[count]; + new_envp = strndupa(old_envp, max_envp_len - 1); + + /* LD_PRELOAD already have variables other than sandbox_lib, + * thus we have to add sandbox_lib via a white space. */ + if (0 != strcmp(envp[count], "LD_PRELOAD=")) { + strncpy(new_envp + strlen(old_envp), ":", + max_envp_len - strlen(new_envp)); + strncpy(new_envp + strlen(old_envp) + 1, sandbox_lib, + max_envp_len - strlen(new_envp)); + } else { + strncpy(new_envp + strlen(old_envp), sandbox_lib, + max_envp_len - strlen(new_envp)); + } + + /* Valid string? */ + new_envp[max_envp_len] = '\0'; + + /* envp[count] = new_envp; + * + * Get rid of the "read-only" warnings */ + memcpy((void *)&envp[count], &new_envp, sizeof(new_envp)); + + break; + } + } + count++; + } + + errno = old_errno; + check_dlsym(execve); + result = true_execve(filename, argv, envp); + old_errno = errno; + + if (old_envp) { + /* Restore envp[count] again. + * + * envp[count] = old_envp; */ + memcpy((void *)&envp[count], &old_envp, sizeof(old_envp)); + old_envp = NULL; + } + } + + errno = old_errno; + + return result; +} + +/* + * Internal Functions + */ + +#if (GLIBC_MINOR == 1) + +/* This hack is needed for glibc 2.1.1 (and others?) + * (not really needed, but good example) */ +extern int fclose(FILE *); +static int (*true_fclose)(FILE *) = NULL; +int fclose(FILE *file) +{ + int result = - 1; + + check_dlsym(fclose); + result = true_fclose(file); + + return result; +} + +#endif /* GLIBC_MINOR == 1 */ + +static void init_context(sbcontext_t* context) +{ + memset(context, 0, sizeof(sbcontext_t)); + context->show_access_violation = 1; +} + +static int is_sandbox_pid() +{ + int old_errno = errno; + int result = 0; + FILE* pids_stream = NULL; + int pids_file = -1; + int current_pid = 0; + int tmp_pid = 0; + + init_wrappers(); + + pids_stream = true_fopen(PIDS_FILE, "r"); + + if (NULL == pids_stream) { + perror(">>> pids file fopen"); + } + else + { + pids_file = fileno(pids_stream); + + if (pids_file < 0) { + perror(">>> pids file fileno"); + } else { + current_pid = getpid(); + + while (EOF != fscanf(pids_stream, "%d\n", &tmp_pid)) { + if (tmp_pid == current_pid) { + result = 1; + break; + } + } + } + if (EOF == fclose(pids_stream)) { + perror(">>> pids file fclose"); + } + pids_stream = NULL; + pids_file = -1; + } + + errno = old_errno; + + return result; +} + +static void clean_env_entries(sbprefix_t* prefix) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + int i = 0; + + if (NULL != prefix->strs) { + for (i = 0; i < prefix->count; i++) { + if (NULL != prefix->strs[i]) { + free(prefix->strs[i]); + prefix->strs[i] = NULL; + } + } + free(prefix->strs); + prefix->strs = NULL; + prefix->count = 0; + } + if (prefix->last_env) { + free(prefix->last_env); + prefix->last_env = NULL; + } + + errno = old_errno; +} + +static void init_env_entries(sbprefix_t* prefix, char* env) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + char* prefixes_env = getenv(env); + + if (NULL == prefixes_env) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Sandbox error : the %s environmental variable should be defined.\n", + env); + } else { + char *ptr; + int num_colons = 0; + + /* Check to see if the env value has changed since the + last time this was initalized, don't do the work again + if it hasn't. + */ + + if (prefix->last_env && !strcmp(prefix->last_env, prefixes_env)) { + errno = old_errno; + return; + } + + /* Clean any existing entries */ + clean_env_entries(prefix); + + /* Env value is different, update the cached copy */ + prefix->last_env = strdup(prefixes_env); + + ptr = prefixes_env; + while (*ptr) { + if (*ptr++ == ':') ++num_colons; + } + + if (prefix->strs) { + free(prefix->strs); + prefix->strs = 0; + } + prefix->strs = (char**)malloc((num_colons+1) * sizeof(char*)); + if (!prefix->strs) return; + memset(prefix->strs, 0, (num_colons+1) * sizeof(char*)); + prefix->count = 0; + + ptr = prefixes_env; + while (*ptr) { + char *next_colon = strchr(ptr, ':'); + if (next_colon) { + if (next_colon != ptr) { + char *str = strndup(ptr, next_colon-ptr); + if (!str) return; + prefix->strs[prefix->count++] = filter_path(str); + free(str); + } + } else { + prefix->strs[prefix->count++] = filter_path(ptr); + break; + } + + ptr = next_colon+1; + } + } + errno = old_errno; +} + +static char* filter_path(const char* path) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + char* filtered_path = (char *)malloc(MAXPATHLEN * sizeof(char)); + filtered_path[0] = 0; + + canonicalize(path, filtered_path); + + errno = old_errno; + + return filtered_path; +} + +static int check_access(sbcontext_t* sbcontext, const char* func, const char* path) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + int result = -1; + int i = 0; + char* filtered_path = filter_path(path); + + if (!filtered_path) { + errno = old_errno; + return 0; + } + + if ('/' != filtered_path[0]) { + free(filtered_path); + errno = old_errno; + return 0; + } + + if ((0 == strncmp(filtered_path, "/etc/ld.so.preload", 18)) && (is_sandbox_pid())) { + result = 1; + } + + if (-1 == result) { + if (NULL != sbcontext->deny.strs) { + for (i = 0; i < sbcontext->deny.count; i++) { + if (NULL != sbcontext->deny.strs[i]) { + if (0 == strncmp(filtered_path, + sbcontext->deny.strs[i], + strlen(sbcontext->deny.strs[i]))) { + result = 0; + break; + } + } + } + } + + if (-1 == result) { + if ((NULL != sbcontext->read.strs) && + ((0 == strncmp(func, "open_rd", 7)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "popen", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "opendir", 7)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "system", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "execl", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "execlp", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "execle", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "execv", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "execvp", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "execve", 6)) + ) + ) { + for (i = 0; i < sbcontext->read.count; i++) { + if (NULL != sbcontext->read.strs[i]) { + if (0 == strncmp(filtered_path, + sbcontext->read.strs[i], + strlen(sbcontext->read.strs[i]))) { + result = 1; + break; + } + } + } + } + else if ((NULL != sbcontext->write.strs) && + ((0 == strncmp(func, "open_wr", 7)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "creat", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "creat64", 7)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "mkdir", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "mknod", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "mkfifo", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "link", 4)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "symlink", 7)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "rename", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "utime", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "utimes", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "unlink", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "rmdir", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "chown", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "lchown", 6)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "chmod", 5)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "truncate", 8)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "ftruncate", 9)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "truncate64", 10)) || + (0 == strncmp(func, "ftruncate64", 11)) + ) + ) { + struct stat tmp_stat; + +#if 0 // write_denied is never set + + for (i = 0; i < sbcontext->write_denied.count; i++) { + if (NULL != sbcontext->write_denied.strs[i]) { + if (0 == strncmp(filtered_path, + sbcontext->write_denied.strs[i], + strlen(sbcontext->write_denied.strs[i]))) { + result = 0; + break; + } + } + } +#endif + + if (-1 == result) { + for (i = 0; i < sbcontext->write.count; i++) { + if (NULL != sbcontext->write.strs[i]) { + if (0 == strncmp(filtered_path, + sbcontext->write.strs[i], + strlen(sbcontext->write.strs[i]))) { + result = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + if (-1 == result) { + /* hack to prevent mkdir of existing dirs to show errors */ + if (0 == strncmp(func, "mkdir", 5)) { + if (0 == stat(filtered_path, &tmp_stat)) { + sbcontext->show_access_violation = 0; + result = 0; + } + } + + if (-1 == result) { + for (i = 0; i < sbcontext->predict.count; i++) { + if (NULL != sbcontext->predict.strs[i]) { + if (0 == strncmp(filtered_path, + sbcontext->predict.strs[i], + strlen(sbcontext->predict.strs[i]))) { + sbcontext->show_access_violation = 0; + result = 0; + break; + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + } + + if (-1 == result) { + result = 0; + } + + if (filtered_path) free(filtered_path); + filtered_path = NULL; + + errno = old_errno; + + return result; +} + +static int check_syscall(sbcontext_t* sbcontext, const char* func, const char* file) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + int result = 1; + struct stat log_stat; + char* log_path = NULL; + char* absolute_path = NULL; + char* tmp_buffer = NULL; + int log_file = 0; + struct stat debug_log_stat; + char* debug_log_env = NULL; + char* debug_log_path = NULL; + int debug_log_file = 0; + char buffer[512]; + + init_wrappers(); + + if ('/' == file[0]) { + absolute_path = (char *)malloc((strlen(file) + 1) * sizeof(char)); + sprintf(absolute_path, "%s", file); + } else { + tmp_buffer = get_current_dir_name(); + absolute_path = (char *)malloc((strlen(tmp_buffer) + 1 + strlen(file) + 1) * sizeof(char)); + sprintf(absolute_path,"%s/%s", tmp_buffer, file); + + if (tmp_buffer) free(tmp_buffer); + tmp_buffer = NULL; + } + + log_path = getenv("SANDBOX_LOG"); + debug_log_env = getenv("SANDBOX_DEBUG"); + debug_log_path = getenv("SANDBOX_DEBUG_LOG"); + + if (((NULL == log_path) || + (0 != strncmp(absolute_path, log_path, strlen(log_path)))) && + ((NULL == debug_log_env) || + (NULL == debug_log_path) || + (0 != strncmp(absolute_path, debug_log_path, strlen(debug_log_path)))) && + (0 == check_access(sbcontext, func, absolute_path)) + ) { + if (1 == sbcontext->show_access_violation) { + fprintf(stderr, "\e[31;01mACCESS DENIED\033[0m %s:%*s%s\n", + func, (int)(10 - strlen(func)), "", absolute_path); + + if (NULL != log_path) { + sprintf(buffer, "%s:%*s%s\n", func, (int)(10 - strlen(func)), "", absolute_path); + + if ((0 == lstat(log_path, &log_stat)) && + (0 == S_ISREG(log_stat.st_mode)) + ) { + fprintf(stderr, + "\e[31;01mSECURITY BREACH\033[0m %s already exists and is not a regular file.\n", + log_path); + } else { + log_file = true_open(log_path, + O_APPEND | O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH); + if(log_file >= 0) { + write(log_file, buffer, strlen(buffer)); + close(log_file); + } + } + } + } + + result = 0; + } + else if (NULL != debug_log_env) { + if (NULL != debug_log_path) { + if (0 != strncmp(absolute_path, debug_log_path, strlen(debug_log_path))) { + sprintf(buffer, "%s:%*s%s\n", func, (int)(10 - strlen(func)), "", absolute_path); + + if ((0 == lstat(debug_log_path, &debug_log_stat)) && + (0 == S_ISREG(debug_log_stat.st_mode)) + ) { + fprintf(stderr, + "\e[31;01mSECURITY BREACH\033[0m %s already exists and is not a regular file.\n", + log_path); + } else { + debug_log_file = true_open(debug_log_path, + O_APPEND | O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH); + if(debug_log_file >= 0) { + write(debug_log_file, buffer, strlen(buffer)); + close(debug_log_file); + } + } + } + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "\e[32;01mACCESS ALLOWED\033[0m %s:%*s%s\n", + func, (int)(10 - strlen(func)), "", absolute_path); + } + } + + if (absolute_path) free(absolute_path); + absolute_path = NULL; + + errno = old_errno; + + return result; +} + +static int is_sandbox_on() +{ + int old_errno = errno; + + /* $SANDBOX_ACTIVE is an env variable that should ONLY + * be used internal by sandbox.c and libsanbox.c. External + * sources should NEVER set it, else the sandbox is enabled + * in some cases when run in parallel with another sandbox, + * but not even in the sandbox shell. + * + * Azarah (3 Aug 2002) + */ + if ((NULL != getenv("SANDBOX_ON")) && + (0 == strncmp(getenv("SANDBOX_ON"), "1", 1)) && + (NULL != getenv("SANDBOX_ACTIVE")) && + (0 == strncmp(getenv("SANDBOX_ACTIVE"), "armedandready", 13)) + ) { + errno = old_errno; + + return 1; + } else { + errno = old_errno; + + return 0; + } +} + +static int before_syscall(const char* func, const char* file) +{ + int old_errno = errno; + int result = 1; + + /* Only allow one thread to access sbcontext at a time */ + sem_wait(&ctxsem); + + if (!sbcontext) { + sbcontext = (sbcontext_t*)malloc(sizeof(sbcontext_t)); + init_context(sbcontext); + } else { + /* sometimes this value gets set to 0 */ + sbcontext->show_access_violation = 1; + } + + init_env_entries(&sbcontext->deny, "SANDBOX_DENY"); + init_env_entries(&sbcontext->read, "SANDBOX_READ"); + init_env_entries(&sbcontext->write, "SANDBOX_WRITE"); + init_env_entries(&sbcontext->predict, "SANDBOX_PREDICT"); + + result = check_syscall(sbcontext, func, file); + + if (sem_post(&ctxsem)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed trying to release semaphore\n"); + } + + errno = old_errno; + + if (0 == result) { + errno = EACCES; + } + + return result; +} + +static int before_syscall_open_int(const char* func, const char* file, int flags) +{ + if ((flags & O_WRONLY) || (flags & O_RDWR)) { + return before_syscall("open_wr", file); + } else { + return before_syscall("open_rd", file); + } +} + +static int before_syscall_open_char(const char* func, const char* file, const char* mode) +{ + if ((strcmp(mode, "r") == 0) || (strcmp(mode, "rb") == 0)) { + return before_syscall("open_rd", file); + } else { + return before_syscall("open_wr", file); + } +} + + +// vim:expandtab noai:cindent ai diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.bashrc b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.bashrc new file mode 100644 index 000000000..35fa89b64 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.bashrc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# Copyright (C) 2001 Geert Bevin, Uwyn, http://www.uwyn.com +# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, v2 or later +# Author : Geert Bevin <gbevin@uwyn.com> +# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/sandbox.bashrc,v 1.1 2002/08/25 06:09:05 azarah Exp $ +source /etc/profile +export LD_PRELOAD="$SANDBOX_LIB" +alias make="make LD_PRELOAD=$SANDBOX_LIB" +alias su="su -c '/bin/bash -rcfile $SANDBOX_DIR/sandbox.bashrc'" diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.c b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7dccf62b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.c @@ -0,0 +1,816 @@ +/* +** Path sandbox for the gentoo linux portage package system, initially +** based on the ROCK Linux Wrapper for getting a list of created files +** +** to integrate with bash, bash should have been built like this +** +** ./configure --prefix=<prefix> --host=<host> --without-gnu-malloc +** +** it's very important that the --enable-static-link option is NOT specified +** +** Copyright (C) 2001 Geert Bevin, Uwyn, http://www.uwyn.com +** Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, v2 or later +** Author : Geert Bevin <gbevin@uwyn.com> +** $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/sandbox.c,v 1.4 2002/10/20 21:37:30 azarah Exp $ +*/ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/resource.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include "sandbox.h" + +int preload_adaptable = 1; +int cleaned_up = 0; +int print_debug = 0; + +/* Read pids file, and load active pids into an array. Return number of pids in array */ +int load_active_pids(int fd, int **pids) +{ + char *data = NULL; + char *ptr = NULL, *ptr2 = NULL; + int my_pid; + int num_pids = 0; + long len; + + pids[0] = NULL; + + len = file_length(fd); + + /* Allocate and zero datablock to read pids file */ + data = (char *)malloc((len + 1)*sizeof(char)); + memset(data, 0, len + 1); + + /* Start at beginning of file */ + lseek(fd, 0L, SEEK_SET); + + /* read entire file into a buffer */ + read(fd, data, len); + + ptr = data; + + /* Loop and read all pids */ + while (1) { + /* Find new line */ + ptr2 = strchr(ptr, '\n'); + if (ptr2 == NULL) break; /* No more PIDs */ + + /* clear the \n. And ptr should have a null-terminated decimal string */ + ptr2[0] = 0; + + my_pid = atoi(ptr); + + /* If the PID is still alive, add it to our array */ + if ((0 != my_pid) && (0 == kill(my_pid, 0))) { + pids[0] = (int *)realloc(pids[0], (num_pids + 1)*sizeof(int)); + pids[0][num_pids] = my_pid; + num_pids++; + } + + /* Put ptr past the NULL we just wrote */ + ptr = ptr2 + 1; + } + + if (data) free(data); + + return num_pids; +} + +/* Read ld.so.preload file, and loads dirs into an array. Return number of entries in array */ +int load_preload_libs(int fd, char ***preloads) +{ + char *data = NULL; + char *ptr = NULL, *ptr2 = NULL; + int num_entries = 0; + long len; + + preloads[0] = NULL; + + len = file_length(fd); + + /* Allocate and zero datablock to read pids file */ + data = (char *)malloc((len + 1)*sizeof(char)); + memset(data, 0, len + 1); + + /* Start at beginning of file */ + lseek(fd, 0L, SEEK_SET); + + /* read entire file into a buffer */ + read(fd, data, len); + + ptr = data; + + /* Loop and read all pids */ + while (1) { + /* Find new line */ + ptr2 = strchr(ptr, '\n'); + + /* clear the \n. And ptr should have a null-terminated decimal string + * Don't break from the loop though because the last line may not + * terminated with a \n + */ + if (NULL != ptr2) ptr2[0] = 0; + + /* If listing does not match our libname, add it to the array */ + if ((strlen(ptr)) && (NULL == strstr(ptr, LIB_NAME))) { + preloads[0] = (char **)realloc(preloads[0], (num_entries + 1)*sizeof(char **)); + preloads[0][num_entries] = strdup(ptr); + num_entries++; + } + + if (NULL == ptr2) break; /* No more PIDs */ + + /* Put ptr past the NULL we just wrote */ + ptr = ptr2 + 1; + } + + if (data) free(data); + + return num_entries; +} + + +void cleanup() +{ + int i = 0; + int success = 1; + int pids_file = -1, num_of_pids = 0; + int *pids_array = NULL; + char pid_string[255]; +#ifdef USE_LD_SO_PRELOAD + int preload_file = -1, num_of_preloads = 0; + char preload_entry[255]; + char **preload_array = NULL; +#endif + + + /* remove this sandbox's bash pid from the global pids + * file if it has rights to adapt the ld.so.preload file */ + if ((1 == preload_adaptable) && (0 == cleaned_up)) { + cleaned_up = 1; + success = 1; + + if (print_debug) printf("Cleaning up pids file.\n"); + + /* Stat the PIDs file, make sure it exists and is a regular file */ + if (file_exist(PIDS_FILE, 1) <= 0) { + perror(">>> pids file is not a regular file"); + success = 0; + /* We should really not fail if the pidsfile is missing here, but + * rather just exit cleanly, as there is still some cleanup to do */ + return; + } + + pids_file = file_open(PIDS_FILE, "r+", 0); + if (-1 == pids_file) { + success = 0; + /* Nothing more to do here */ + return; + } + + /* Load "still active" pids into an array */ + num_of_pids = load_active_pids(pids_file, &pids_array); + //printf("pids: %d\r\n", num_of_pids); + +#ifdef USE_LD_SO_PRELOAD + /* clean the /etc/ld.so.preload file if no other sandbox + * processes are running anymore */ + if (1 == num_of_pids) { + success = 1; + + if (print_debug) printf("Cleaning up /etc/ld.so.preload.\n"); + + preload_file = file_open("/etc/ld.so.preload", "r+", 0); + if (-1 != preload_file) { + /* Load all the preload libraries into an array */ + num_of_preloads = load_preload_libs(preload_file, &preload_array); + //printf("num preloads: %d\r\n", num_of_preloads); + /* Clear file */ + file_truncate(preload_file); + + /* store the other preload libraries back into the /etc/ld.so.preload file */ + if(num_of_preloads > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < num_of_preloads; i++) { + sprintf(preload_entry, "%s\n", preload_array[i]); + if (write(preload_file, preload_entry, strlen(preload_entry)) != strlen(preload_entry)) { + perror(">>> /etc/ld.so.preload file write"); + success = 0; + break; + } + } + } + + /* Free memory used to store preload array */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_preloads; i++) { + if (preload_array[i]) free(preload_array[i]); + preload_array[i] = NULL; + } + if (preload_array) free(preload_array); + preload_array = NULL; + + file_close(preload_file); + preload_file = -1; + } + } +#endif + + file_truncate(pids_file); + + /* if pids are still running, write only the running pids back to the file */ + if(num_of_pids > 1) { + for (i = 0; i < num_of_pids; i++) { + sprintf(pid_string, "%d\n", pids_array[i]); + if (write(pids_file, pid_string, strlen(pid_string)) != strlen(pid_string)) { + perror(">>> pids file write"); + success = 0; + break; + } + } + + file_close(pids_file); + pids_file = -1; + } else { + + file_close(pids_file); + pids_file = -1; + + /* remove the pidsfile, as this was the last sandbox */ + unlink(PIDS_FILE); + } + + if (pids_array != NULL) { + free(pids_array); + pids_array = NULL; + } + } + + if (0 == success) { + return; + } +} + +void stop(int signum) +{ + printf("Caught signal %d\r\n", signum); + cleanup(); +} + +void setenv_sandbox_write(char *home_dir, char *portage_tmp_dir, char *var_tmp_dir, char *tmp_dir) +{ + char sandbox_write_var[1024]; + + if (!getenv(ENV_SANDBOX_WRITE)) { + /* these should go into make.globals later on */ + strcpy(sandbox_write_var, ""); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/dev/zero:/dev/fd/:/dev/null:/dev/pts/:/dev/vc/:/dev/tty:/tmp/"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + /* NGPT support */ + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/dev/shm/ngpt"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/var/log/scrollkeeper.log"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, home_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/.gconfd/lock"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, home_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/.bash_history"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/usr/tmp/conftest"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/usr/lib/conftest"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/usr/tmp/cf"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/usr/lib/cf"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + if (NULL == portage_tmp_dir) { + strcat(sandbox_write_var, tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, var_tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/tmp/"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/var/tmp/"); + + /* How the heck is this possible?? we just set it above! */ + } else if (0 == strcmp(sandbox_write_var, "/var/tmp/")) { + strcat(sandbox_write_var, portage_tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/tmp/"); + + /* Still don't think this is possible, am I just stupid or something? */ + } else if (0 == strcmp(sandbox_write_var, "/tmp/")) { + strcat(sandbox_write_var, portage_tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, var_tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/var/tmp/"); + + /* Amazing, one I think is possible */ + } else { + strcat(sandbox_write_var, portage_tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, var_tmp_dir); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/tmp/"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_write_var, "/var/tmp/"); + } + + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_WRITE, sandbox_write_var, 1); + } +} + + +void setenv_sandbox_predict(char *home_dir) +{ + char sandbox_predict_var[1024]; + + if (!getenv(ENV_SANDBOX_PREDICT)) { + /* these should go into make.globals later on */ + strcpy(sandbox_predict_var, ""); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, home_dir); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, "/."); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, "/usr/lib/python2.0/"); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, "/usr/lib/python2.1/"); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, ":"); + strcat(sandbox_predict_var, "/usr/lib/python2.2/"); + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_PREDICT, sandbox_predict_var, 1); + } +} + +int print_sandbox_log(char *sandbox_log) +{ + int sandbox_log_file = -1; + char *beep_count_env = NULL; + int i, beep_count = 0; + long len = 0; + char *buffer = NULL; + + sandbox_log_file=file_open(sandbox_log, "r", 0); + if (-1 == sandbox_log_file) { + return 0; + } + + len = file_length(sandbox_log_file); + buffer = (char *)malloc((len + 1)*sizeof(char)); + memset(buffer, 0, len + 1); + read(sandbox_log_file, buffer, len); + file_close(sandbox_log_file); + + printf("\e[31;01m--------------------------- ACCESS VIOLATION SUMMARY ---------------------------\033[0m\n"); + printf("\e[31;01mLOG FILE = \"%s\"\033[0m\n", sandbox_log); + printf("\n"); + printf("%s", buffer); + if (buffer) free(buffer); buffer = NULL; + printf("\e[31;01m--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\033[0m\n"); + + beep_count_env = getenv(ENV_SANDBOX_BEEP); + if (beep_count_env) { + beep_count = atoi(beep_count_env); + } else { + beep_count = DEFAULT_BEEP_COUNT; + } + + for (i = 0; i < beep_count; i++) { + fputc('\a', stderr); + if (i < beep_count -1) { + sleep(1); + } + } + return 1; +} + +int spawn_shell(char *argv_bash[]) +{ +#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_SHELL + int i = 0; + char *sh = NULL; + int first = 1; + int ret; + long len = 0; + + while (1) { + if (NULL == argv_bash[i]) break; + if (NULL != sh) len = strlen(sh); + sh = (char *)realloc(sh, len+strlen(argv_bash[i]) + 5); + if (first) { + sh[0] = 0; + first = 0; + } + strcat(sh, "\""); + strcat(sh, argv_bash[i]); + strcat(sh, "\" "); + + //printf("%s\n", argv_bash[i]); + i++; + } + printf("%s\n", sh); + ret = system(sh); + if (sh) free(sh); + sh = NULL; + + if (-1 == ret) return 0; + return 1; + +#else +# ifndef NO_FORK + int pid; + int status = 0; + int ret = 0; + + pid = fork(); + + /* Child's process */ + if (0 == pid) { +# endif + execv(argv_bash[0], argv_bash); +# ifndef NO_FORK + return 0; + } else if (pid < 0) { + return 0; + } + ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if ((-1 == ret) || (status > 0)) return 0; +# endif + return 1; +#endif +} + +int main(int argc, char** argv) +{ + int i = 0, success = 1; + int preload_file = -1; + int sandbox_log_presence = 0; + int sandbox_log_file = -1; + int pids_file = -1; + long len; + + int *pids_array = NULL; + int num_of_pids = 0; + + // char run_arg[255]; + char portage_tmp_dir[PATH_MAX]; + char var_tmp_dir[PATH_MAX]; + char tmp_dir[PATH_MAX]; + char sandbox_log[255]; + char sandbox_debug_log[255]; + char sandbox_dir[255]; + char sandbox_lib[255]; + char sandbox_rc[255]; + char pid_string[255]; + char **argv_bash = NULL; + + char *run_str = "-c"; + char *home_dir = NULL; + char *tmp_string = NULL; +#ifdef USE_LD_SO_PRELOAD + char **preload_array = NULL; + int num_of_preloads = 0; +#endif + + /* Only print info if called with no arguments .... */ + if (argc < 2) { + print_debug = 1; + } + + if (print_debug) printf("========================== Gentoo linux path sandbox ===========================\n"); + + + /* check if a sandbox is already running */ + if (NULL != getenv(ENV_SANDBOX_ON)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Not launching a new sandbox instance\nAnother one is already running in this process hierarchy.\n"); + exit(1); + } else { + + /* determine the location of all the sandbox support files */ + if (print_debug) printf("Detection of the support files.\n"); + + /* Generate base sandbox path */ + tmp_string = get_sandbox_path(argv[0]); + strncpy(sandbox_dir, tmp_string, 254); + if (tmp_string) free(tmp_string); + tmp_string = NULL; + strcat(sandbox_dir, "/"); + + /* Generate sandbox lib path */ + tmp_string = get_sandbox_lib(sandbox_dir); + strncpy(sandbox_lib, tmp_string, 254); + if (tmp_string) free(tmp_string); + tmp_string = NULL; + + /* Generate sandbox bashrc path */ + tmp_string = get_sandbox_rc(sandbox_dir); + strncpy(sandbox_rc, tmp_string, 254); + if (tmp_string) free(tmp_string); + tmp_string = NULL; + + /* verify the existance of required files */ + if (print_debug) printf("Verification of the required files.\n"); + + if (file_exist(sandbox_lib, 0) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open the sandbox library at '%s'.\n", sandbox_lib); + return -1; + } else if (file_exist(sandbox_rc, 0) <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open the sandbox rc file at '%s'.\n", sandbox_rc); + return -1; + } + +#ifdef USE_LD_SO_PRELOAD + /* ensure that the /etc/ld.so.preload file contains an entry for the sandbox lib */ + if (print_debug) printf("Setting up the ld.so.preload file.\n"); +#endif + + /* check if the /etc/ld.so.preload is a regular file */ + if (file_exist("/etc/ld.so.preload", 1) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, ">>> /etc/ld.so.preload file is not a regular file\n"); + exit(1); + } + + /* Our r+ also will create the file if it doesn't exist */ + preload_file=file_open("/etc/ld.so.preload", "r+", 1, 0644); + if (-1 == preload_file) { + preload_adaptable = 0; +/* exit(1);*/ + } + +#ifdef USE_LD_SO_PRELOAD + /* Load entries of preload table */ + num_of_preloads = load_preload_libs(preload_file, &preload_array); + + /* Zero out our ld.so.preload file */ + file_truncate(preload_file); + + /* Write contents of preload file */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_preloads + 1; i++) { + /* First entry should be our sandbox library */ + if (0 == i) { + if (write(preload_file, sandbox_lib, strlen(sandbox_lib)) != strlen(sandbox_lib)) { + perror(">>> /etc/ld.so.preload file write"); + success = 0; + break; + } + } else { + /* Output all other preload entries */ + if (write(preload_file, preload_array[i - 1], strlen(preload_array[i - 1])) != strlen(preload_array[i - 1])) { + perror(">>> /etc/ld.so.preload file write"); + success = 0; + break; + } + } + /* Don't forget the return character after each line! */ + if (1 != write(preload_file, "\n", 1)) { + perror(">>> /etc/ld.so.preload file write"); + success = 0; + break; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_of_preloads; i++) { + if (preload_array[i]) free(preload_array[i]); + preload_array[i] = NULL; + } + if (preload_array) free(preload_array); + num_of_preloads = 0; + preload_array = NULL; +#endif + + /* That's all we needed to do with the preload file */ + file_close(preload_file); + preload_file = -1; + + /* set up the required environment variables */ + if (print_debug) printf("Setting up the required environment variables.\n"); + + /* Generate sandbox log full path */ + tmp_string=get_sandbox_log(); + strncpy(sandbox_log, tmp_string, 254); + if (tmp_string) free(tmp_string); + tmp_string = NULL; + + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_LOG, sandbox_log, 1); + + snprintf(sandbox_debug_log, 254, "%s%s%s", DEBUG_LOG_FILE_PREFIX, pid_string, LOG_FILE_EXT); + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_DEBUG_LOG, sandbox_debug_log, 1); + + home_dir = getenv("HOME"); + + /* drobbins: we need to expand these paths using realpath() so that PORTAGE_TMPDIR + * can contain symlinks (example, /var is a symlink, /var/tmp is a symlink.) Without + * this, access is denied to /var/tmp, hurtin' ebuilds. + */ + + realpath(getenv("PORTAGE_TMPDIR"),portage_tmp_dir); + realpath("/var/tmp",var_tmp_dir); + realpath("/tmp",tmp_dir); + + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_DIR, sandbox_dir, 1); + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_LIB, sandbox_lib, 1); + setenv("LD_PRELOAD", sandbox_lib, 1); + + if (!getenv(ENV_SANDBOX_DENY)) { + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_DENY, LD_PRELOAD_FILE, 1); + } + + if (!getenv(ENV_SANDBOX_READ)) { + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_READ, "/", 1); + } + + /* Set up Sandbox Write path */ + setenv_sandbox_write(home_dir, portage_tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, tmp_dir); + setenv_sandbox_predict(home_dir); + + setenv(ENV_SANDBOX_ON, "1", 0); + + /* if the portage temp dir was present, cd into it */ + if (NULL != portage_tmp_dir) { + chdir(portage_tmp_dir); + } + + argv_bash=(char **)malloc(6 * sizeof(char *)); + argv_bash[0] = strdup("/bin/bash"); + argv_bash[1] = strdup("-rcfile"); + argv_bash[2] = strdup(sandbox_rc); + if (argc < 2) { + argv_bash[3] = NULL; + } else { + argv_bash[3] = strdup(run_str); /* "-c" */ + } + argv_bash[4] = NULL; /* strdup(run_arg); */ + argv_bash[5] = NULL; + + if (argc >= 2) { + for (i = 1; i< argc; i++) { + if (NULL == argv_bash[4]) len = 0; + else len = strlen(argv_bash[4]); + argv_bash[4]=(char *)realloc(argv_bash[4], (len + strlen(argv[i]) + 2) * sizeof(char)); + if (0 == len) argv_bash[4][0] = 0; + if (1 != i) strcat(argv_bash[4], " "); + strcat(argv_bash[4], argv[i]); + } + } +#if 0 + char* argv_bash[] = { + "/bin/bash", + "-rcfile", + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + + /* adding additional bash arguments */ + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + if (1 == i) { + argv_bash[3] = run_str; + argv_bash[4] = run_arg; + strcpy(argv_bash[4], argv[i]); + } else { + strcat(argv_bash[4], " "); + strcat(argv_bash[4], argv[i]); + } + } +#endif + + /* set up the required signal handlers */ + signal(SIGHUP, &stop); + signal(SIGINT, &stop); + signal(SIGQUIT, &stop); + signal(SIGTERM, &stop); + + /* this one should NEVER be set in ebuilds, as it is the one + * private thing libsandbox.so use to test if the sandbox + * should be active for this pid, or not. + * + * azarah (3 Aug 2002) + */ + + setenv("SANDBOX_ACTIVE", "armedandready", 1); + + + /* Load our PID into PIDs file if environment is adaptable */ + if (preload_adaptable) { + success = 1; + if (file_exist(PIDS_FILE, 1) < 0) { + success = 0; + fprintf(stderr, ">>> pids file is not a regular file"); + } else { + pids_file=file_open(PIDS_FILE, "r+", 1, 0644); + if (-1 == pids_file) { + success = 0; + } else { + /* Grab still active pids */ + num_of_pids = load_active_pids(pids_file, &pids_array); + + /* Zero out file */ + file_truncate(pids_file); + + /* Output active pids, and append our pid */ + for (i = 0; i < num_of_pids + 1; i++) { + /* Time for our entry */ + if (i == num_of_pids) { + sprintf(pid_string, "%d\n", getpid()); + } else { + sprintf(pid_string, "%d\n", pids_array[i]); + } + if (write(pids_file, pid_string, strlen(pid_string)) != strlen(pid_string)) { + perror(">>> /etc/ld.so.preload file write"); + success = 0; + break; + } + } + /* Clean pids_array */ + if (pids_array) free(pids_array); + pids_array = NULL; + num_of_pids = 0; + + /* We're done with the pids file */ + file_close(pids_file); + } + } + + /* Something went wrong, bail out */ + if (success == 0) + exit(1); + } + + /* STARTING PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT */ + if (print_debug) { + printf("The protected environment has been started.\n"); + printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n"); + } + + if (print_debug) printf("Shell being started in forked process.\n"); + + /* Start Bash */ + if (!spawn_shell(argv_bash)) { + if (print_debug) fprintf(stderr, ">>> shell process failed to spawn\n"); + success = 0; + } + + /* Free bash stuff */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + if (argv_bash[i]) free(argv_bash[i]); + argv_bash[i] = NULL; + } + if (argv_bash) free(argv_bash); + argv_bash = NULL; + + if (print_debug) { + printf("Cleaning up sandbox process\n"); + } + + cleanup(); + + if (print_debug) { + printf("========================== Gentoo linux path sandbox ===========================\n"); + printf("The protected environment has been shut down.\n"); + } + + if (file_exist(sandbox_log, 0)) { + sandbox_log_presence = 1; + success = 1; + if (!print_sandbox_log(sandbox_log)) { + success = 0; + } + +#if 0 + if (!success) { + exit(1); + } +#endif + sandbox_log_file = -1; + } else if (print_debug) { + printf("--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n"); + } + + if ((sandbox_log_presence) || (!success)) { + return 1; + } else { + return 0; + } + } +} + + + +// vim:expandtab noai:cindent ai diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.h b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d750fdd76 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox.h @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad House <brad@mainstreetsoftworks.com>, + * Possibly based on code from Geert Bevin, Uwyn, http://www.uwyn.com + * Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, v2 or later + * Author: Brad House <brad@mainstreetsoftworks.com> + * + * $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/sandbox.h,v 1.2 2002/12/04 18:11:32 azarah Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __SANDBOX_H__ +#define __SANDBOX_H__ + +/* Uncomment below to use flock instead of fcntl (POSIX way) to lock/unlock files */ +/* #define USE_FLOCK */ + +/* Uncomment below to use system() to execute the shell rather than execv */ +/* #define USE_SYSTEM_SHELL */ + +/* Uncomment below to use /etc/ld.so.preload (could be very intrusive!!) */ +/* #define USE_LD_SO_PRELOAD */ + +/* Uncommend to not have the protected shell forked, just run in parent process */ +/* ONLY FOR DEBUGGING PURPOSES!! (strace needs it like that) */ +/* #define NO_FORK */ + + +#define LD_PRELOAD_FILE "/etc/ld.so.preload" +#define LIB_NAME "libsandbox.so" +#define BASHRC_NAME "sandbox.bashrc" +#define PIDS_FILE "/tmp/sandboxpids.tmp" +#define LOG_FILE_PREFIX "/tmp/sandbox-" +#define DEBUG_LOG_FILE_PREFIX "/tmp/sandbox-debug-" +#define LOG_FILE_EXT ".log" + +#define ENV_SANDBOX_DEBUG_LOG "SANDBOX_DEBUG_LOG" +#define ENV_SANDBOX_LOG "SANDBOX_LOG" +#define ENV_SANDBOX_DIR "SANDBOX_DIR" +#define ENV_SANDBOX_LIB "SANDBOX_LIB" + +#define ENV_SANDBOX_DENY "SANDBOX_DENY" +#define ENV_SANDBOX_READ "SANDBOX_READ" +#define ENV_SANDBOX_WRITE "SANDBOX_WRITE" +#define ENV_SANDBOX_PREDICT "SANDBOX_PREDICT" + +#define ENV_SANDBOX_ON "SANDBOX_ON" +#define ENV_SANDBOX_BEEP "SANDBOX_BEEP" + +#define DEFAULT_BEEP_COUNT 3 + +char *get_sandbox_path(char *argv0); +char *get_sandbox_lib(char *sb_path); +char *get_sandbox_rc(char *sb_path); +char *get_sandbox_log(); +char *sb_dirname(const char *path); +int file_getmode(char *mode); +long file_tell(int fp); +int file_lock(int fd, int lock, char *filename); +int file_unlock(int fd); +int file_locktype(char *mode); +int file_open(char *filename, char *mode, int perm_specified, ...); +void file_close(int fd); +long file_length(int fd); +int file_truncate(int fd); +int file_exist(char *filename, int checkmode); + +#endif + + +// vim:expandtab noai:cindent ai diff --git a/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox_futils.c b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox_futils.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2aab3f6e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sandbox-dev/sandbox_futils.c @@ -0,0 +1,352 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad House <brad@mainstreetsoftworks.com> + * Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License, v2 or later + * Author: Brad House <brad@mainstreetsoftworks.com> + * + * $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-src/portage/src/sandbox-dev/Attic/sandbox_futils.c,v 1.3 2002/12/04 18:11:32 azarah Exp $ + * + */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/resource.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> + +#include "sandbox.h" + + +char *get_sandbox_path(char *argv0) +{ + char path[255]; + char *cwd = NULL; + + /* ARGV[0] specifies full path */ + if (argv0[0] == '/') { + strncpy(path, argv0, 254); + + /* ARGV[0] specifies relative path */ + } else { + getcwd(cwd, 253); + sprintf(path, "%s/%s", cwd, argv0); + if (cwd) free(cwd); + cwd = NULL; + } + + /* Return just directory */ + return(sb_dirname(path)); +} + +char *get_sandbox_lib(char *sb_path) +{ + char path[255]; + + snprintf(path, 254, "/lib/%s", LIB_NAME); + if (file_exist(path, 0) <= 0) { + snprintf(path, 254, "%s%s", sb_path, LIB_NAME); + } + return(strdup(path)); +} + +char *get_sandbox_rc(char *sb_path) +{ + char path[255]; + + snprintf(path, 254, "/usr/lib/portage/lib/%s", BASHRC_NAME); + if (file_exist(path, 0) <= 0) { + snprintf(path, 254, "%s%s", sb_path, BASHRC_NAME); + } + return(strdup(path)); +} + +char *get_sandbox_log() +{ + char path[255]; + char pid_string[20]; + char *sandbox_log_env = NULL; + + sprintf(pid_string, "%d", getpid()); + + strcpy(path, LOG_FILE_PREFIX); + sandbox_log_env = getenv(ENV_SANDBOX_LOG); + if (sandbox_log_env) { + strcat(path, sandbox_log_env); + strcat(path, "-"); + } + strcat(path, pid_string); + strcat(path, LOG_FILE_EXT); + return(strdup(path)); +} + +/* Obtain base directory name. Do not allow trailing / */ +char *sb_dirname(const char *path) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + char *ptr = NULL; + int loc = 0, i; + int cut_len = -1; + + /* don't think NULL will ever be passed, but just in case */ + if (NULL == path) return(strdup(".")); + + /* Grab pointer to last slash */ + ptr = strrchr(path, '/'); + if (NULL == ptr) { + return(strdup(".")); + } + + /* decimal location of pointer */ + loc = ptr - path; + + /* Remove any trailing slash */ + for (i = loc-1; i >= 0; i--) { + if (path[i] != '/') { + cut_len = i + 1; /* make cut_len the length of the string to keep */ + break; + } + } + + /* It could have been just a plain /, return a 1byte 0 filled string */ + if (-1 == cut_len) return(strdup("")); + + /* Allocate memory, and return the directory */ + ret = (char *)malloc((cut_len + 1) * sizeof(char)); + memcpy(ret, path, cut_len); + ret[cut_len] = 0; + + return(ret); +} + +/* +char* dirname(const char* path) +{ + char* base = NULL; + unsigned int length = 0; + + base = strrchr(path, '/'); + if (NULL == base) + { + return strdup("."); + } + while (base > path && *base == '/') + { + base--; + } + length = (unsigned int) 1 + base - path; + + base = malloc(sizeof(char)*(length+1)); + memmove(base, path, length); + base[length] = 0; + + return base; +}*/ + +/* Convert text (string) modes to integer values */ +int file_getmode(char *mode) +{ + int mde = 0; + if (0 == strcasecmp(mode, "r+")) { + mde = O_RDWR | O_CREAT; + } else if (0 == strcasecmp(mode, "w+")) { + mde = O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC; + } else if (0 == strcasecmp(mode, "a+")) { + mde = O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_APPEND; + } else if (0 == strcasecmp(mode, "r")) { + mde = O_RDONLY; + } else if (0 == strcasecmp(mode, "w")) { + mde = O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC; + } else if (0 == strcasecmp(mode, "a")) { + mde = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT; + } else { + mde = O_RDONLY; + } + return(mde); +} + +/* Get current position in file */ +long file_tell(int fp) +{ + return(lseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_CUR)); +} + +/* lock the file, preferrably the POSIX way */ +int file_lock(int fd, int lock, char *filename) +{ + int err; +#ifdef USE_FLOCK + if (flock(fd, lock) < 0) { + err = errno; + fprintf(stderr, ">>> %s flock file lock: %s\n", filename, strerror(err)); + return 0; + } +#else + struct flock fl; + fl.l_type = lock; + fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + fl.l_start = 0L; + fl.l_len = 0L; + fl.l_pid = getpid(); + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &fl) < 0) { + err = errno; + fprintf(stderr, ">>> %s fcntl file lock: %s\n", filename, strerror(err)); + return 0; + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +/* unlock the file, preferrably the POSIX way */ +int file_unlock(int fd) +{ +#ifdef USE_FLOCK + if (flock(fd, LOCK_UN) < 0) { + perror(">>> flock file unlock"); + return 0; + } +#else + struct flock fl; + fl.l_type = F_UNLCK; + fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + fl.l_start = 0L; + fl.l_len = 0L; + fl.l_pid = getpid(); + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &fl) < 0) { + perror(">>> fcntl file unlock"); + return 0; + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +/* Auto-determine from how the file was opened, what kind of lock to lock + * the file with + */ +int file_locktype(char *mode) +{ +#ifdef USE_FLOCK + if (NULL != (strchr(mode, 'w')) || (NULL != strchr(mode, '+')) || (NULL != strchr(mode, 'a'))) + return(LOCK_EX); + return(LOCK_SH); +#else + if (NULL != (strchr(mode, 'w')) || (NULL != strchr(mode, '+')) || (NULL != strchr(mode, 'a'))) + return(F_WRLCK); + return(F_RDLCK); +#endif +} + +/* Use standard fopen style modes to open the specified file. Also auto-determines and + * locks the file either in shared or exclusive mode depending on opening mode + */ +int file_open(char *filename, char *mode, int perm_specified, ...) +{ + int fd; + char error[250]; + va_list ap; + int perm; + + if (perm_specified) { + va_start(ap, perm_specified); + perm = va_arg(ap, int); + va_end(ap); + } + if (perm_specified) { + fd = open(filename, file_getmode(mode), perm); + } else { + fd = open(filename, file_getmode(mode)); + } + if (-1 == fd) { + snprintf(error, 249, ">>> %s file mode: %s open", filename, mode); + perror(error); + return(fd); + } + /* Only lock the file if opening succeeded */ + if (-1 != fd) { + if (0 == file_lock(fd, file_locktype(mode), filename)) { + close(fd); + return -1; + } + } else { + snprintf(error, 249, ">>> %s file mode:%s open", filename, mode); + perror(error); + } + return(fd); +} + +/* Close and unlock file */ +void file_close(int fd) +{ + if (-1 != fd) { + file_unlock(fd); + close(fd); + } +} + +/* Return length of file */ +long file_length(int fd) +{ + long pos, len; + pos = file_tell(fd); + len = lseek(fd, 0L, SEEK_END); + lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET); + return(len); +} + +/* Zero out file */ +int file_truncate(int fd) +{ + lseek(fd, 0L, SEEK_SET); + if (ftruncate(fd, 0) < 0) { + perror(">>> file truncate"); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/* Check to see if a file exists Return: 1 success, 0 file not found, -1 error */ +int file_exist(char *filename, int checkmode) +{ + struct stat mystat; + + /* Verify file exists and is regular file (not sym link) */ + if (checkmode) { + if (-1 == lstat(filename, &mystat)) { + /* file doesn't exist */ + if (ENOENT == errno) { + return 0; + } else { /* permission denied or other error */ + perror(">>> stat file"); + return -1; + } + } + if (!S_ISREG(mystat.st_mode)) + return -1; + + /* Just plain verify the file exists */ + } else { + if (-1 == stat(filename, &mystat)) { + /* file does not exist */ + if (ENOENT == errno) { + return 0; + } else { /* permission denied or other error */ + perror(">>> stat file"); + return -1; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} + + +// vim:expandtab noai:cindent ai |